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TOWARD A TRADEMARK-BASED LIABILITY SYSTEM

Lynn M. LoPucki
Under current law, trademark owners are not liable for the products sold,
or the wrongful acts of businesses conducted, under the trademarks. This Article
proposes the imposition of such liability. The rationalefor the change is that product
and other liability of businesses to customers is part of the customer's calculus in
choosinga seller. In making their choices, customers rely upon the only information
available in the marketplace-trademarks. The entity structures of businesses (corporate groups, franchises, joint ventures, and the like) are generally invisible to
customers. Yet under current law, businesses' liabilitiesto customers are calculated
from those entity structures. The result isa failure in the market for liability and in
the operation of the liability system: Customers lack the information they need to
contractfor the level of supplier financialresponsibility they prefer.
The proposed rule would create no new liability. It would merely extend existing liability to trademark owners. The rule would extend liability to trademark
owners for (1) defective products sold under the mark and (2) the wrongful acts
of licensees that conduct businesses identified to customers by the mark. The
initial assignment of liability to the trademark owner will make it more difficult
for businesses to externalize their liabilities. Trademark owners will remain free,
however, to reallocate the liability to their licensees by contracts requiringindemnification or insurance.
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INTRODUCTION

Large businesses are seldom owned and operated by a single legal entity.
Most are complex arrays of entities.' A typical array may be composed of thirty
or forty corporations and limited liability companies that are members of a
corporate group, together with the group members' franchisees, partners
(legally or merely figuratively), joint venturers, and numerous other kinds
of affiliates.2 Liability incurred by such an array attaches to one or more of
the array's entities. The entity or entities charged are selected through the
application of complex attribution rules to an entity structure that the arraymembers or their attorneys created. For example, if the business is conducted
under the famous trademark of the parent company, but the employee tortfeasor is employed by an obscure subsidiary, the employee will be liable and
respondeat superior will transmit that liability only to the subsidiary.
Customers of such an array rarely understand its entity structure. We
know them only by their trademarks and trade names. We pull into a Mobil
station for gas, we buy a Honeywell keyboard, and we have confidence in the
integrity of the Academy Awards vote count because Price Waterhouse certifies the results.
If litigation ensues, however, we are often disappointed to learn that, in
the eyes of the law, the icons on which we relied do not exist. That is, liability
law recognizes no entity or actor corresponding to Mobil, Honeywell, or Price
Waterhouse.' We did not pull into a Mobil station; we pulled into an independent station licensed to display Mobil trademarks. Honeywell neither
manufactured nor sold the "Honeywell" keyboard we bought; a subsidiary in
1. I have invented the term "array" out of necessity. "Corporate group" is a narrower concept that includes only those entities affiliated through common ownership.
2. For example, thousands of "independent" franchisees operate gasoline service stations
under the Mobil name and hundreds of independent partnerships do business as "Price Waterhouse."
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modem Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J.
1687, 1691 (1999) ("IThe general acceptance today of the principle that trademarks can be licensed
to others, at least under some circumstances, reflects a world in which the production of goods is less
tied to a particular corporate structure than ever before.").
3. The property of a corporate group or array is owned not by the group or array, but by its
members. A plaintiff cannot sue a group, but only members of a group. When a plaintiff sues members
of a group, the law will calculate the liability of each accused group member separately, based on the
particular member's involvement in the allegedly wrongful act.
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the Honeywell group did. Price Waterhouse did not certify the Academy
Awards vote count; only one of many accounting firms licensed to use that
name did. The immediate effect of these icons' nonexistence will often be to
confine legal liability to previously invisible trademark licensees. If those
licensees are not financially responsible, the ultimate effect may be to
defeat liability altogether.
Even if a product or business identifies itself to the public only by a trademark, the trademark owner may not be liable for the product's defects or the
business's wrongful acts. Three recent cases illustrate this phenomenon.
First, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford,4 the plaintiff-a college student
majoring in music-entered a Mobil Mini Mart gas station where a station
employee beat him so severely that he ended up with three metal plates in
his head. The employee had a history of assaulting customers.' Mobil Oil
Corporation, owner of the Mobil trademarks, owned the station. Trademarked
Mobil products were sold from the station. Mobil trademarks and logos
were used throughout the premises. Employees were required to wear Mobil
uniforms, and the employee who beat the plaintiff was wearing a Mobil hat
during the incident.6 The court implicitly assumed that the employee committed the tort in the scope of his employment. But the court nevertheless held
Mobil Oil Corporation not liable because the employee worked not for
Mobil, but for an "independent businessman" who operated the minimart as
a Mobil franchise Mobil licensed the trademarks and logos to the franchisee. Respondeat superior rendered the franchisee liable for the wrongful act
of the franchisee's employee, but no rule transmitted that liability to Mobil
Oil Corporation.
Second, in Yoder v. Honeywell Inc.,8 the plaintiff suffered repetitive stress
syndrome from use of two defective keyboards marketed under the Honeywell
trademark.9 Even though the keyboards bore no indication of their source
except that trademark, the court upheld a summary judgment in favor of
Honeywell Inc." Honeywell Inc. neither manufactured nor distributed
4.
648 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1995). For another similar case, see Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 207
F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 2000), which held Conoco, Inc. not liable for racial discrimination by its franchisees. See also Randall K. Hanson, The FranchisingDilemma Continues: Update on FranchisorLiability
for Wrongful Acts by Local Franchisees, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 91 (1997) (discussing cases). Randall
Hanson concludes that "some decisions indicate that typical franchise provisions constitute
control and liability while other decisions indicate that typical controls are not sufficient
to impose liability." Id. at 112.
5. See Mobil Oil Corp., 648 So. 2d at 120.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See id.
Id.
104 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 1218.
See id. at 1225.
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the keyboards. It merely licensed its Honeywell trademark for use on
keyboards that Bull HN Information Systems, Inc.-a wholly owned subsidiary
of Honeywell Inc.-manufactured and distributed. Hence, the court reasoned,
Honeywell Inc. was not liable as a manufacturer or a distributor." Nor was
Honeywell Inc. liable as an "apparent manufacturer" because that doctrine
2
can be applied only against an entity that is "in the chain of distribution."'
Third, in Young v. Jones,3 the plaintiff had lost $550,000 it invested in
reliance on an erroneous audit letter. The letter was on "Price Waterhouse letterhead" and gave no other indication of its source. 4 Price Waterhouse Bahamas
issued the letter. That firm was licensed to use the Price Waterhouse trademark, but was neither owned nor controlled by the owner of the Price
Waterhouse trademark." In the plaintiff's action against Price Waterhouse
U.S., the court held that the mere fact the two partnerships were doing
business under the same trademark was not sufficient to render one liable for
the wrongful act of the other. 6
These are not isolated cases. 7 Passive trademark owners are not liable for
the wrongful acts of those who do business under their marks. This Article pro11.
See id. at 1223-24 (declining to hold Honeywell Inc. because it neither sold nor distributed the keyboards).
Id. at 1224; see also David J.Franklyn, The Apparent ManufacturerDoctrine, Trademark
12.
Licensors and the Third Restatement of Torts, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 692-708 (1999)
(describing the apparent manufacturer doctrine).
816 F. Supp. 1070 (D.S.C. 1992), affd sub nom. Young v. F.D.I.C., 103 F.3d 1180 (4th
13.
Cir. 1997).
Young, 816 F. Supp. at 1074 ("The letterhead identified the Bahamian accounting firm
14.
only as 'Price Waterhouse.' The audit letter also bore a Price Waterhouse trademark and was
signed 'Price Waterhouse."').
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit described the relationship in these words:
15.
PW-Bahamas is part of a world-wide organization of separate and independent Price
Waterhouse firms that practice accountancy in various countries. The members of each
Price Waterhouse firm hold shares in Price Waterhouse World Firm Limited (PW-World
Firm), a limited liability company incorporated under the laws of Bermuda. PW-World
Firm assists the various Price Waterhouse firms in advancing their respective practices,
and it facilitates the maintenance of uniform standards of practice. It does not conduct
or supervise client engagements, however. Nor does it play a part in the day-to-day
management of the Price Waterhouse firms.
Young, 103 F.3d at 1191 n.6.
In Young, the court relied on § 16(1) of the Uniform Partnership Act, as adopted in
16.
South Carolina. See Young, 103 F.3d at 1192. The substance of that provision has been retained
in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. See R.U.P.A. § 308(a), (b), (e) (1997) (requiring an
"existing partnership" to which a purported partner must be represented to belong as a prerequisite
to holding persons not partners as to each other liable to third persons). In Young, no actual partnership existed between Price Waterhouse U.S. and Price Waterhouse Bahamas, so no basis would
exist for holding Price Waterhouse liable to third parties.
See, e.g., Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451 (2d Cit. 1995) (rejecting four theories
17.
under which Kodak was charged with liability for defective computer keyboards manufactured by a
Kodak subsidiary and marketed using the Kodak name); David J. Franklyn, Toward a Coherent Theory of
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poses to reverse that rle.'8 Trademark owners who authorize franchisees, subsidiaries, affiliates, and other licensees to use the owners' trademarks to identify
themselves or their products to customers should be jointly and severally
obligated for the licensees' liabilities to those customers. The reason for imposing this liability on trademark owners is that the relationships through which
liability arises are largely contractual. Most customers assume they are dealing
with the trademark owner, and even those who realize they are not lack the
information necessary to contract meaningfully with the entities that operate
behind the trademark's mask. In short, trademark owner liability is necessary
for the largely contractual system of tort liability to work because trademarks
are the only information available to most actors in the marketplace. 9
Courts and commentators have assumed that the entity structures of
businesses presumptively provide an appropriate basis for liability. They have
brushed the information problem aside by engaging in the legal fiction that
customers know the entity structures of the businesses with whom they deal.2 °
Strict Tort Liability for Trademark Licensors, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 20-30 (1998) (analyzing the case
law on trademark licensor liability in the product liability context).
18.
The drafters of the Restatement recently rejected trademark owner liability in the products
liability context. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 14 cmt. d (1998)
(stating that the trademark licensor who does not sell or otherwise distribute products is not liable under
the Restatement). James Henderson, coreporter for that Restatement, explained that the intent of the
provision referred to was not to advocate a position, but merely to recognize the majority view that
declines to place liability on trademark owners who neither manufacture nor sell the products involved.
See Telephone Interview with James A. Henderson, Jr., Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell
Law School (May 30, 2001).
In the franchising context, Thomas McCarthy, the leading commentator on trademarks, describes
the current situation as follows: "In general, it is accurate to conclude that there is a very substantial risk
that a trademark licensor or franchisor will be held liable for the torts of licensees and franchisees." 2 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:74 (4th ed.
2001); see also John L. Hanks, FranchisorLiabilityfor the Torts of Its Franchisees:The Case for Substituting
Liability as a Guarantorfor the Current Vicarious Liability, 24 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1999)
("Unlike most areas of law that are frequently litigated, the law of franchisor liability for the torts of
their franchisees remains unsettled, with courts unable to achieve a consensus in their approach.").
19.
See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
479 (1997).
20.
In one of the cases already discussed, for example, the Supreme Court of Florida stated that
"[iun today's world, it iswell understood that the mere use of franchise logos and related advertisements
does not necessarily indicate that the franchisor has actual or apparent control over any substantial
aspect of the franchisee's business or employment decisions." Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d
119, 120 (Fla. 1995) (holding Mobil Oil Corporation not liable for the tort of a Mobil Mini Mart
employee). Similar statements abound in the law governing franchisors' liability. See Robert W.
Emerson, Franchisors'Liability When Franchisees Are Apparent Agents: An Empirical and Policy Analysis
of "Common Knowledge" About Franchising, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 609, 610-12 (1992) (citing cases).
Professor Robert Emerson has demonstrated convincingly that such statements are wrong:
[l]hese courts misread the relative state of "common knowledge," since only 9.9% of the
respondents [in a random telephone survey] correctly answered that most Chevron gas stations
are locally owned and operated, while 57.0% erroneously believed that they were mostly
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The assumption and fiction have caused those courts and commentators to
focus their attention on the actual relationship between the trademark owner
and the entity doing business under the mark.2 The actual relationship, however, is invisible to contracting customers and should therefore be considered
irrelevant.22
Part I of this Article describes the arcane system that determines who is
liable to customers for the wrongful acts of a business. In essence, customers are
deemed to accept the liability of the entity doing business under the trademark,
not the entity that owns the trademark-even if they have no way of knowing
who or what the former entity is. Part II explains the rationale for the proposed
liability extension-trademark owners are better able to evaluate the entity
structures and financial responsibility of their licensees than are customers. If
trademark owners share the liability of their licensees, customers will be able to
rely on trademarks in choosing the persons with whom they deal, and trademark
owners will have appropriate incentives to exert control over their licensees.
Part III defines the scope of the proposed extension by describing the conditions
under which the proposed liability should arise. Part IV notes the residual vulnerability of the proposed liability to judgment proofing-strategic action that
blocks the enforcement of judgments-but concludes that cultural and political
considerations will be sufficient to restrain judgment proofing in this unique
context. Part V summarizes the proposal and the reasons for its adoption.

I. THE MARKET FOR LIABILITY
Markets for goods and services operate simultaneously as markets for
liability. The selection of a seller or supplier is not only a selection of a product
nationally owned and operated, and 28.0% incorrectly concluded that most were dually
owned and operated both nationally and locally.
Id. at 653.
See Franklyn, supra note 17, at 5-6 (advocating a rule that would impose liability only on
21.
"[trademark] licensors who are not mere passive investors but who exert substantial control over their
licensees, and who use the licensing arrangement to improperly shield themselves from liability").
With respect to franchisors, two commentators have reached the same conclusion I do:
22.
Trademark owners should be liable for the torts of their franchisees. Neither reached that conclusion
for the reasons I present here, and neither generalized it to other kinds of trademark ownerlicensee relationships. See Hanks, supra note 18, at 8 (advocating that franchisors be held liable as
guarantors of the tort liability of their franchisees); Note, Liability of a Franchisor for Acts of the
Franchisee, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 143, 160 (1968) ("The desirability of protecting the third party
requires that the franchisor exercise control over the franchisee and the possession of this control
generally makes the franchisor the appropriate party to be held liable for harm arising out of the
operation of the franchise."); see also Michael R. Flynn, Note, The Law of Franchisor Vicarious
Liability: A Critique, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 89, 106-07 (criticizing the uncertainty in current
law and presenting three alternative proposals for reform, but declining to choose among them
without further study).
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or service, but also a contract for legal and financial responsibility in the event
that the product or service fails or the customer or third parties are injured at
any stage of the relationship. To illustrate, when Janice the carpenter chooses
to shop for her lumber at Home Depot, she is choosing the entities that will
have legal liability to her or parties claiming through her. That liability might
arise because she is injured while shopping, the lumber is not delivered on time,
or defects in the lumber cause injuries to her or to third parties. To understand
the effect that bundling products or services with liability has on the market for
liability, it is first necessary to understand how the liability system works.
A.

Liability System Principles

The liability system operates according to a set of principles that are so
basic they often go unnoticed." First, with rare exceptions, liability accrues
only to legal entities: corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies,
individuals, and the like.24 As the system currently operates, a business cannot
be liable." Second, liability is generally enforced only against property, not the
entities themselves. Only in rare circumstances can courts order entities to pay
debts.26 The judgment creditor's right is to force the sale of the debtor-entity's
property and be paid from the proceeds of sale.27 Once that source of payment
is exhausted, enforcement ends. Third, the property that may be sold is only
that of the debtor-the particular entity to which liability accrued."
Complex legal rules determine what entity or entities are liable for
particular wrongful acts. To continue with the above illustration, if Edgar, an
23.
See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 8-13 (1996) (describing
the liability system's underlying principles).
24.
To put the matter another way, to say that something is not an entity is to say that the
law will not impose liability on it. See, e.g., State v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 609 S.W.2d
263, 268 (Tex. App. 1980) ("Neither a partnership nor a joint venture exists in this case. The Project
itself is not a legal entity, and is not liable for the assessment or payment of any taxes against any of the
properties comprising the Project.").
25.
That is, one cannot obtain a judgment against a business, even if the business is coextensive with the entity. Professor Phillip Blumberg has long argued that the law has increasingly
accepted "enterprises"-essentially "businesses"-as the basis for liability. See Phillip I. Blumberg,
The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation
Liabilities, 28 CONN. L. REV. 295 (1996). Blumberg's arguments, however, pertain principally to
the obligations of regulated enterprises to obey regulatory laws. See id. at 307-12. As to civil
liability, Blumberg's examples of "enterprise liability" are merely examples of cases in which courts
hold particular entities liable for the debts of other entities in extraordinary circumstances. See,
e.g., id. at 326-29 (discussing the bankruptcy doctrines of substantive consolidation, equitable
subordination, and fraudulent transfer law as applied to intragroup guaranties). The effect of "enterprise
liability" is not to hold businesses liable, but to hold more entities liable.
26.
See LoPucki, supra note 23, at 9.
27.
See id.
28.
See id. at 9-10.
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employee who mops the floors at Home Depot, negligently leaves a puddle
of water and Janice is injured when she slips on the water and falls, Edgar will
be liable. It is unlikely, however, that Janice will be able to recover any
judgment she obtains by forcing a sale of Edgar's property. Even if Edgar owns
his own home and automobile, those items of property may be fully encumbered to prior creditors" or exempt from execution." If so, Edgar is "judgment
proof"3'-the judgment cannot, as a practical matter, be enforced against him.
With respect to substantial judgments at least, nearly all employees are judgment proof.32
The liability system is able to operate nevertheless because the law renders
additional entities vicariously liable on a variety of theories." Those entities
include employers, manufacturers, sellers, entities that delegate the performance of inherently dangerous tasks to independent contractors, and entities
that delegate any task to an incompetent contractor.34
On the facts of the above illustration, the doctrine of respondeat superior
will transmit liability to Edgar's employer.35 If Edgar's employer is Home Depot,
29.

Secured creditors have priority over creditors who later seek to enforce judgments. See

HENRYJ. BAILEY III & RICHARD B. HAGEDORN, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 366 (4th ed. 2000):

The [Uniform Commercial] Code does not expressly deal with priority between a secured
party with a perfected security interest and a creditor who has subsequently obtained a
lien on the collateral by attachment, garnishment, levy or the like. However, it is clearly
implied that the secured party with a prior perfected interest should prevail over a subsequent lien creditor ....
Id. For an explanation of how this priority blocks recovery by the subsequent judgment creditor, see
LoPucki, supra note 23, at 14-19, which describes "secured debt strategies" for judgment proofing.
Statutes in every state designate specific property as "exempt" from the remedies avail30.
able to the holder of a money judgment. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 136-57 (3d ed. 1996) (describing exemption
laws and giving examples).
Debtors are referred to as "judgment proof' when their assets, if any, are held in forms that
31.
render enforcement of judgments against them impossible. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure
of Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REV. 147, 149-56 (1998) (describing the basic structure common to
all judgment proofing). Judgment proofing is referred to as "hard" if it "aims at denying all recovery to
every plaintiff' and "soft" if it "contemplates payment of judgments in relatively small amounts but
discharge of judgments in relatively large amounts." LoPucki, supra note 23, at 46-47.
See, e.g., James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's
32.
The Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363, 1367 (1998) ("Most individuals have always been
judgment proof .. "). But see Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer
Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1764 (1996) (asserting, without authority, that "in the
modern world many employees have substantial solvency").
33.
See generally Schwartz, supra note 32 (discussing the rationales for vicarious liability).
34.
Delegation to a judgment-proof independent contractor, without more, is not sufficient
to render the delegator liable. See Robinson v. Jiffy Executive Limousine Co., 4 F.3d 237, 242-43
(3d Cit. 1993) (holding that the hiring of a "judgment proof" independent contractor was not the
hiring of an "incompetent" independent contractor so as to render the person hiring liable).
The doctrine of respondeat superior generally makes employers liable for the wrongful
35.
acts of their employees committed in the scope of the latter's employment. See generally JAMES A.
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Inc., a prosperous corporation that owns hundreds of stores and carries substantial liability insurance, the effect will be to render Janice's judgment collectible.
Even if the insurance company failed to pay, Janice could force sale of sufficient
property belonging to the judgment debtor to satisfy the judgment.
If, instead, Edgar were employed by an insolvent franchisee that leased the
store, licensed the right to use the Home Depot name, and carried no liability
insurance, the effect might be to render Janice's judgment uncollectible. The
entity liable under respondeat superior-the franchisee corporation-might
have no unencumbered assets from which Janice could satisfy her judgment.
That the entity was judgment proof might mean that it would go out of
business, but not necessarily. A judgment-proof entity can discharge its
obligations in bankruptcy while continuing to operate its business. 6 When
liability accrues only against judgment-proof entities, the effect is much the
same as if there had been no liability at all. 7
The law deliberately offers businesses a variety of devices for limiting
liability. "Limited liability" entities, which today include not only corporations but also limited liability companies (LLCs), limited liability partnerships (LLPs), and limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs), insulate
their owners from liability the entities generate. The assets of a single business
can be divided among the entities of a "corporate group" so that the entities
that generate liability are not the ones that own the assets.3" Assets that
otherwise would be available to satisfy judgments against a member of the
group--including one corporation's stock ownership in another-can be
protected by encumbering them.39 Franchise agreements can block liability
by inserting an "independent business" between the seller and the buyer of
a product.' Leasing property to a tenant who assumes responsibility for the
property's condition relieves the owners of most liability for injuries to third
parties on the premises." Provided that the property owners carefully structure
HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 149-59 (5th ed. 1999) (explaining the doctrine of
respondeat superior).

36.

See LoPucki, supra note 23, at 17-18.

37.
One difference is that the victim may derive some satisfaction from winning a judgment despite his or her inability to collect. Another is that the owners of the tortfeasor entities

may be inconvenienced by the "failure" of their business. Upon failure, one or more secured
creditors initially may control the assets, but if the former owners wish to resume their ownership

(subject to the secured debt) the former owners may be able to reacquire control by striking a bar-

gain with the secured creditors. See LoPucki, supra note 31, at 154-55 (explaining the economic

forces that will reunite the business with its former owners).
38.
See LoPucki, supra note 23, at 20-23.
39.

See id. at 14-18 (explaining how encumbrances protect assets from other creditors).

40.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
41.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Loy, 499 S.E.2d 140 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an ownerlandlord who has fully parted with possession and the right to possession is not liable for damages
resulting from the negligence of the tenant); Evans v. United Bank of Ill., 589 N.E.2d 933, 936
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their relationships with the managers, the property owners need not risk even
the capital they have invested.42
This Article refers to the particular combination of liability-limiting
devices employed by a business as the "entity structure" of the business. To
illustrate the concept, at the time Jeremy Bransford walked into the Mobil
Mini Mart to meet his fate, Mobil Oil Corporation was one of ten subsidiaries
of Mobil Corporation." Mobil Oil Corporation in turn had eighteen subsidiaries, some of which had their own subsidiaries. 4 The entire corporate
group-known as "Mobil" or "Mobil Oil"-consisted of about 100 corporations45 with assets totaling about $41 billion.46 Each of the assets comprising
that total value was owned by some member of the corporate group. Some
members may have owned substantial assets, others may have owned no assets
at all. From the public record, it is impossible to tell what portion of the $41
billion in assets any particular entity owned. The stock of most members of the
group was owned entirely by other members of the group, but some of the
stock of some members of the group was owned by outsiders.47
One can tell from the public record that Mobil Oil Corporation-the
entity Bransford sued--owned most of Mobil's U.S. trademarks, including the
ones displayed on Mobil Mini Marts.4" Mobil Oil Corporation also owned
the land and building occupied by the Mobil Mini Mart.49 Mobil Oil
Corporation contracted with an "independent businessman" as franchisee to
operate the Mobil Mini Mart where Bransford was beaten." The independent
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992) ("'Generally, the tenant who is in possession, not the landlord, is liable for
injuries sustained by third persons because of a failure to keep the property in repair."' (quoting
Wright v. Mr. Quick, Inc., 486 N.E.2d 908, 909 (I11.1985))).
42.
For example, the investor might purchase a hotel for $100 million and lease it at arm'slength to a firm that would manage it. The investors' $100 million would not be at risk in the
operation of the hotel. See Johnson, 499 S.E.2d at 140; Evans, 589 N.E.2d at 933.
43.
See MOBIL CORP., FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1991, at Exhibit 22
(indicating ten Level 2 subsidiaries). Prior to 1991, Mobil Corporation listed its subsidiaries in filings,
but did not indicate which subsidiaries owned which others. The statements in the text are based
on the assumption that the entity structure remained the same from 1990 to the end of 1991.
44.
See id. (indicating eighteen Level 3 subsidiaries of Mobil Oil Corporation).
45. See MOBIL CORP., FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1990, at Exhibit
22 (listing the names of ninety-nine corporations).
46. See MOBIL CORP., FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1990, at 5
(indicating assets of approximately $39 billion at the end of 1989 and $40.8 billion on September
30, 1990).
47.
See MOBIL CORP., supra note 45, at Exhibit 22 (indicating percentages of stock owned by
other corporations in the group).
48.
See, e.g., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Trademark for "Mobil Mart," Registration No.
1338384, available at http://tess.uspto.gov (last visited Mar. 6, 2002) (showing registration to have
occurred May 28, 1985 and current registrant to be Mobil Oil Corporation, a New York corporation).
49.
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d 119, 120 (Fla. 1995) (noting that "Mobil
owned the property").
50.
Id.
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businessman leased the land, licensed the trademarks from Mobil Oil
Corporation, and agreed that he would "render prompt, fair, courteous, and
efficient service to... customers."'"
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, the plaintiff had urged the court to
transmit liability from the franchisee to Mobil Oil Corporation on an "apparent agency" theory. That theory required a "representation by [Mobil Oil
Corporation]" that Mobil Oil Corporation "was exercising substantial control"
over the operation of the Mobil Mini Mart.52 The court held that the mere
use of trademarks was not such a representation. 53
Had Bransford prevailed on that argument, liability would have reached
Mobil Oil Corporation, a member of the Mobil corporate group. The groupwhich results from the division of ownership of Mobil's business among
numerous entities-is itself an entity structure created in large part to limit or
defeat liability. 4 For example, had Mobil Oil Corporation fully encumbered

the trademarks and leased the other assets it used in its business rather than
owning them, Bransford could not have recovered from those assets. But in
that event, he might have invoked various other legal doctrines-such as
"piercing the corporate veil" or "enterprise liability"-in an attempt to transmit
the liability to other members of the Mobil group." Ifhe succeeded, he might
have recovered from the assets owned by those members.
Lawyers for potential defendants deploy entity structures-set up subsidiaries, write leases and licenses, and otherwise isolate assets to protect them
from anticipated liabilities-before liabilities come into existence." Courts
51.

Id.at 123.
52. Id.at 121.
53.
See id.
54.
See Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413, 1427
(1998) (arguing that "[1]imiting liability is widely understood to be the principal reason for the
separate incorporation of subsidiaries"). But see White, supra note 32, at 1388-91 (arguing that
corporations have other reasons for incorporating subsidiaries).
55.
In particular circumstances, the courts are authorized to disregard specific aspects of the
entity structure by "piercing the veil" of a limited liability entity or consolidating the debts and
assets of two or more entities.

See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

315-31 (1996) (describing the legal doctrines); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J.
CORP. L. 479 (2001) (same). In practice, however, such disregard is rare. See Robert B. Thompson,
Piercing the
Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J.INT'L
L. 379, 385-88 (1999) (showing that despite judicial rh~toric to the contrary, piercing the
corporate veil within a corporate group on behalf of a tort plaintiff isextremely rare).
56.
Numerous books have been written on, and entire journals devoted to, the topic of "asset
protection planning."

See, e.g., DUNCAN E. OSBORNE, ASSET PROTECTION: DOMESTIC AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TACTICS (1995) (providing a four-volume practice guide). Professor Elena
Marty-Nelson notes that "many experienced practitioners in the area regard complex asset
protection
strategies--with their nearly impenetrable protections for the assets of wealthy clients-as the perfect
antidote to the unpredictability of a tort litigation system run amok." Elena Marty-Nelson, Domestic and
International
Asset ProtectionPlanning,45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1269,1269 (1996).
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treat those entity structures as the presumptive starting points for calculating
the reach of liability. Lawyers for plaintiffs then seek to persuade the courts to
pierce deeply enough into the entity structures to reach assets sufficient to
satisfy the liabilities. In that effort they employ doctrines such as apparent
agency,57 apparent manufacturer," and enterprise theory 9 that may, in particular circumstances, transmit liability to a trademark owner. But, the mere status
of the trademark owner as such is an insufficient basis on which to impose
liability. 6' Use of the trademark to identify the tortfeasor's product or business
is merely one of several factors that determine the trademark owner's liability
under current law. Thus, the extent of enforceable legal liability is the product
of a complex, problematic strategy game."
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, the court concluded that liability attached
to the employee who beat Bransford and was transmitted to the franchisee by
operation of the doctrine of respondeat superior.62 There the liability stopped.
The plaintiff could reach assets owned by, and insurance provided to, the
employee or the franchisee, subject to other limitations such as laws exempting
assets from legal process or granting priority to secured creditors. But if neither
of the liable defendants had nonexempt, unencumbered assets, the court was
saying Bransford should not recover at all.
B.

"Contracting" for Liability

The three cases with which this Article began illustrate the contractual
underpinnings of businesses' "tort" liability to their customers. When a customer
Although some egregious instances of corporate judgment proofing inevitably come to light, see,
e.g., infra note 156 (discussing Pacific Gas & Electric), systematically documenting the deliberate use
of these devices to defeat tort liability isa dauntingly difficult task. Most of the necessary information is
secret. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 54, at 1416-17 (explaining the lack of public data on the
holdings of individual members of corporate groups). That judgment proofing is not occurring,
however, issimply implausible because such large amounts of money are at stake. See id. at 1413 (listing
U.S. companies that suffered huge tort losses).
57.
See Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 197 (Del. 1978) (reversing summary
judgment against Hilton Hotels Corporation in a case seeking to hold Hilton liable for the acts of a
franchisee's employee on the theory of apparent agency).
58.
See, e.g., Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 831 F.2d 153, 155 (7th Cir. 1987) (recognizing, but refusing to apply the "apparent manufacturer" doctrine to hold Trane liable for a heater
manufactured and sold by its subsidiary, Trane-Canada).
59.
See, e.g., Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 901 F.2d 750 (9th Cit. 1990) (holding
Goodyear liable for defective tire on an "enterprise theory" because it significantly participated in the overall process by which the tire reached its consumers and had the right to control the incidents of manufacture and distribution); see also Franklyn, supra note 17, at 20-30 (reviewing the "enterprise theory" cases).
60.
See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
61.
See Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J. 1405,
1414-28 (2000) (describing law as a strategy game).
62.
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d 119, 124 (Fla. 1995).
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chooses to deal with, or use the products of, a seller of goods or services, the
customer isdeemed to have accepted the seller's entity structure, modified only
by the legal rules for entity-disregard.63 In the vast majority of cases, this
deemed acceptance constitutes the baldest of legal fictions. The customerswhether they are consumers or businesses-will have made their decisions to
deal without knowing even the names of the entities with whom they are
deemed to have dealt, to say nothing of those entities' levels of financial responsibility, available insurance coverages, or vulnerabilities to entity-disregard.
Most customers believe that the trademark owner will be liable and do not
anticipate the restriction of liability based on entity structure.'
Even the most diligent customer could not independently gather the
information necessary to evaluate the entity structure. For large, publicly held
companies, the names of the dozens or hundreds of entities that compose the
seller's group are matters of public record.6" But those public records do not
say what aspects of the business are conducted by what entities or indicate

which of the group's assets are owned by which members. Public companies
disclose only consolidated financial information for the corporate group as a
whole.66 They are not required to, and do not, disclose financial information
for individual entities within the group-even though the individual entities'
financial conditions are determinative of customers' abilities to recover. Nor
are public companies required to disclose even the names of the entities, within
or outside their corporate group, that do business under their trademarks.67

63.
These rules include piercing the corporate veil, substantive consolidation, and enterprise
liability.
64.
See Emerson, supra note 20, at 658-59. Emerson reports empirical findings that
Over 80% of both the student and [older group of respondents] believed that franchisors
are legally obligated to guarantee the services and goods provided by their franchisees,
and almost all of these respondents, plus over 80% of the public respondents, felt that
even if franchisors are not so required, most franchisors do in fact give such guarantees .... [Albout half of the students and [older group] respondents with an answer
thought that franchisors could be forced to pay judgments entered against insolvent
franchisees.
Id.
65.
See 17 C.F.R. 229.601(21)(i) (2001) (requiring that registrants file lists of their subsidiaries as part of their Form 10-K and certain other filings).
66.
See id. 229.301-.302 (permitting the filing of consolidated financial data). That the filing of
financial data in consolidated form is the universal practice can be confirmed by examining the annual
(Form 10-K) and quarterly (Form 10-Q) reports actually filed. These reports can be found on the
EDGAR website, at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
67.
That is, no law requires that a corporation-even a publicly traded one-disclose the names
of its franchisees or trademark licensees, and corporations generally do not disclose them. See,
e.g., JVC Adds Smaller D-ILA, Consumer Electronics, May 22, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, Allnws
file (noting that JVC officials "declined to disclose the names of licensees" who would manufacture its
new, lightweight projector).
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Even if Regina Yoder had engaged a lawyer to assist her in her initial purchase of a "Honeywell" keyboard, she probably could not have discovered the
keyboard manufacturer's name." Further, even if Yoder and her lawyer had
somehow discovered the manufacturer's name, they still could not have discovered the manufacturer's financial condition-even though the manufacturer was
wholly owned by a public company.69 The acting entities' financial conditions
determine the effectiveness of liability under current law, but under current law
the financial conditions of those entities are not public information-even for
"public" companies. Had the manufacturer of Yoder's keyboard been a private
company, the only information available would have been that which the
company had voluntarily chosen to release."
In the current system, customers can obtain information sufficient to
value the liability for which they contract only by compelling their sellers to
divulge it as a condition of dealing. That is in fact what the most sophisticated
customers do in the largest deals. Those customers use the information to
negotiate which entities will be liable, in what amounts, and how much insurance the seller will provide.
The calculation of liability value from an entity structure can be complex.
That complexity sometimes confuses even the most sophisticated players. For
example, after Pennzoil won its $10 billion judgment against Texaco, Inc., the
parent company of the Texaco group,7' Texaco, Inc. transferred assets to other

68.
Bull HN Information Systems, Inc. is mentioned only a single time in Honeywell Inc.'s
Form 10-K for the year in which the complaint was filed. The reference is to office space, not
products manufactured. See HONEYWELL, INC., FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDING MARCH 31,
1993, at Item 2, available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm.
It appears that
Regina Yoder and her lawyer were able to determine the manufacturer of the keyboard only through
discovery. See Yoder v. Honeywell Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 1997):
On December 7, 1994, Honeywell and plaintiffs jointly inspected the keyboards used at the
reservation center where Regina Yoder had worked. Honeywell then formally notified
plaintiffs on February 2, 1995, that Honeywell Information Systems, Inc., a subsidiary of
Honeywell now known as Bull HN Information Systems, Inc., manufactured the keyboards.
Id.
69.
See, e.g., HONEYWELL, INC., supra note 68 (presenting financial information only for the
group, not for entities within the group).
70.
Both public and private firms often release information for credit purposes. Such releases
are, however, voluntary. Most of the releases are through Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., which holds a 90
percent share of the market for business credit reporting. See Trief v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp.,
840 F. Supp. 277, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("D&B Credit Services controls approximately ninety
percent of the market for corporate credit information."). Only subscribers who pay a monthly fee
have access to Dun & Bradstreet information.
71.
Although none of the opinions in the case expressly states that the judgment was solely
against Texaco, Inc., it was the only party to any of the reported opinions. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 784 F.2d 1133, 1133 (2d Cir. 1986);
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 768 (Tex. App. 1987), rev'd, 481 U.S. 1, 1 (1987).
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corporations in the Texaco group to avoid the attachment of judgment liens."
The incident prompted Pennzoil CEO Hugh Leidke to observe plaintively that
' 3
.'I thought that when we were suing Texaco, we were suing all of Texaco.' . If
entity structures can surprise the parties to multibillion dollar litigation, they
are certainly capable of surprising the buyers of industrial machines or Happy
Meals.74
The vast majority of customers will have insufficient leverage to force
disclosure of the financial information necessary to evaluate the financial
responsibility of the persons with whom the customers deal. Among those who
do have sufficient leverage, most will be engaged in transactions too small to
warrant the expense of forcing and analyzing such a disclosure. The large
majority of customers must contract solely on the basis of information readily
accessible at the point of contracting. In most cases, that information will be
the trademark and what the buyer already knows about the trademark from
other sources."
Thus, most customers contract for liability on the basis of trademark, but
receive liability (or fail to receive it) on the basis of entity structure. Because
they cannot investigate the entity structure, they cannot evaluate the liability
they are buying. The effect is to preclude meaningful competition on the basis
of the financial responsibility of the seller. Sellers who choose to be financially
responsible must compete in markets in which customers cannot distinguish
them from sellers who choose to be financially irresponsible. The result is
an unhealthy incentive for all sellers to externalize the costs of liability by
adopting judgment-proof entity structures.
The solution to this problem is to impose liability on the entity that
6
owns the trademark under which the goods or services are sold. This proposed
rule-which I refer to as trademark owner liabi/ity-would not create any new
See THOMAS PETZINGER, JR., OIL & HONOR 430 (1987). But see id. at 434 ("A
72.
Texaco executive later swore in an affidavit that the refinery switch was a long-planned move
intended as part of a plan to consolidate the assets of Getty Oil.").
Janice Castro, A Break in the Action: Texaco's Chapter 11 Buys Time-and Maybe More,
73.
TIME, Apr. 27, 1987, at 52 (quoting Hugh Leidke).
Compare O'Banner v. McDonald's Corp., 670 N.E.2d 632-35 (111.1996) (holding that
74.
McDonald's was not liable for a slip and fall at a franchisee's restaurant), with Emerson, supra note
20, at 680 (finding that only 14 to 19 percent of interview respondents realized that McDonald's
restaurants were locally owned and operated).
See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 759 (1990)
75.
("Successful marks are like packets of information. They lower consumer search costs, thus promoting the efficient functioning of the market.").
The entity that owns the trademark may be only the trademark subsidiary of a corporate
76.
group. Some may prefer that liability be imposed on the entire group doing business under the
trademark. But implementing that alternative using only bright-line rles would be difficult, if not
impossible. In Part IV, infra, I demonstrate that the end result would not be materially different.
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liability. 7 What it would do is impose already-existing liability on an additional party-the trademark owner-thereby improving an injured party's
chances of recovery and, ultimately, the chances that appropriate levels of care
would be taken. The proposed rule would accomplish that by making the
trademark owner jointly and severally liable for various acts of authorized users
of the trademark.

II. THE RATIONALE FOR TRADEMARK OWNER LIABILITY
A.

Trademark Owners, Rather than Customers, Should
Monitor Trademark Users

Businesses display trademarks in order to reassure their customers.
Current law presumes that if a customer responds to a trademark by transacting with the business that displays it, the customer has contracted for the
liability of whatever entity is doing business under the trademark. That is not
the actual intention or expectation of most such customers." They expect the
trademark owner to be responsible for business done under the mark. That
alone should be reason for abandoning the presumption.
The proposal for trademark owner liability set forth in this Article does
not, however, rest merely on the necessity to honor the intentions or expectations of customers. If it did, trademark owners might respond by making
perfectly clear to customers that they do not stand behind the products sold
or the businesses conducted under their trademarks. While that would make
the system of contracting for liability transparent, it would not solve the
problem of system and market failure that ultimately gives rise to the need for
trademark owner liability. The problem is that customers lack the informa77.
Hence, my proposal sidesteps the "enterprise liability" debate over the extent to which
manufacturers should be liable for injuries resulting from use of their products. See, e.g., James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings
of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 215 (2000) ("Numerous legal scholars
have proposed alternatives to the traditional fault-based system for generic product hazards.").
Trademark owners should share whatever liability is appropriately placed on manufacturers of
products sold under the mark.
78.
See Emerson, supra note 20 (presenting surveys of college students' and older groups' understandings of the law).
79.
A system failure occurs when the structure of the system is incapable of achieving the
acknowledged goals of the system. See LoPucki, supra note 19, at 506 (discussing the search for
inconsistency between system goals and system functions). A market failure occurs when a particular system-a market-is incapable of achieving the acknowledged goals of a market-the
proper allocation of goods and services. See, e.g., William P. Albrecht, Regulation of ExchangeTraded and OTC Derivatives: The Need for a Comparative Institution Approach, 21 J. CORP. L. 111,
117 (1995) (defining market failure). Requiring customers to contract without adequate information
causes both a system and a market failure.
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tion necessary to evaluate the financial responsibility of the entities whose
liability is offered.
Trademark owner liability would address the problem by providing an
alternative, mandatory content for the contract. When goods or services are
sold under a mark, the trademark owner guarantees liability for defects in the
product and the financial responsibility of the trademark owners' licensees.
The effect of the rule is to remove most of the risk of defective products and
licensee insolvency from the customer and place it on the trademark owner,
to the extent of the trademark owner's wealth.
The advantage to the liability system is that the trademark ownerunlike the customer-typically has both the opportunity and the bargaining
leverage to investigate and control the risk of insolvency. Trademark owners
license relatively few users of their marks."0 Typically, those licensees are
other members of the corporate group, franchisees, or joint venturers. Trademark owners already have, under current law, the obligation to monitor the
activities of those licensees and control the quality of the goods and services
sold under the mark."1 Thus, this Article's proposal would merely impose
liability for failure to fulfill an already-existing duty. In furtherance of their
already-existing duty, the trademark owners typically obtain financial statements from licensees and require that licensees indemnify the owners against
liability arising out of the licensee's business.82 Thus both the information
system and the contracts necessary for the proposed system are already in place.
By contrast, the information system and contracts necessary for customers to
monitor and respond to the activities of licensees do not exist and their
80.
To illustrate, "at the height of the Cabbage Patch Kids' popularity, [the trademark owner]
had approximately 127 licensees who marketed hundreds of different related products." Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. S. Diamond Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 925, 926 n.2 (1 lth Cir. 1995). The
products were undoubtedly sold through a much larger number of outlets. Typically, the trademark
owner licenses dealers or franchisees but not mere resellers of its products.
81.
See, e.g., 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 18:42 ("[N]ot only does the trademark owner
have the right to control quality, when it licenses, it has the duty to control quality."). Professor
David Franklyn points out that trademark law requires a lower level of control than that which
would render the trademark owner liable under tort law. See Franklyn, supra note 17, at 45-46.
He notes that "[a]lmost every court to address this issue has recognized that the Lanham Act
quality control requirement exists mainly to protect the trademark licensor's ownership rights in
its mark and is not the basis for a tort duty." Id. at 46. My point is in no way in conflict with his.
My point is merely that current law has already put trademark owners in such a position that they
need to inform themselves regarding the quality of their licensees' products and their licensees'
financial responsibility.
82.
See, e.g., 5 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, at Form 28-3
§ 9 (Michael R. Graham & Kevin J. McDevitt eds., 2001) (presenting a form licensing agreement
providing indemnification "against ... suits... arising out of Licensee's promotion, advertising, use or
sale of goods and services under the Mark"); id. at Form 28-4 § 9(2) (presenting a form licensing agreement providing indemnification "against ... liabilities ... or costs ... arising from the
business.., of Licensee").
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creation is impractical. This advantage is magnified by the fact that the
number of trademark owner-licensee relationships is much smaller than the
number of licensee-customer relationships. The smaller number of relationships means that contracting costs will be lower in a system in which trademark
owners rather than customers must monitor. As Professor Alan Sykes has
noted, vicarious liability-such as the trademark owner liability advocated
here-is more likely to be efficient when contracting costs are low. 3 More
monitoring and contracting would be necessary for customers, rather than
trademark owners, to control licensees.
If the law is changed to make trademark owners jointly and severally
liable with authorized users of their marks, customers will be able to rely on
the liability of the trademark owner. The resulting market for liability will be
improved because the information available to most customers-information
relating to the trademark-will provide a better basis for estimating the
financial responsibility of the seller and hence the value of the liability component of the sale.84
The difference in utility of the information conveyed by a trademark
and that conveyed by an entity structure results from the fact that a trademark, unlike an entity structure, is an effort to communicate. 5 That is, the
trademark is the owner's means of identifying itself in the marketplace. Most
owners want their customers to recognize their trademarks and advertising and
to identify them with the owners' goods or services. Unless customers can
distinguish the owner's trademark from the trademarks of others, the owner's
trademark will not have the desired effect of inducing those customers to deal.
Hence, reputable businesses seek trademarks that are distinctive, and often use
several trademarks together to make them easier for customers to recognize.
For example, the Mobil Mini Mart that Bransford patronized did not rely solely
on the Mobil name, but also "prominently displayed [Mobil's] logo [a winged
red horse], insignia, and color scheme in order to induce customers to patronize
the station .... Employees were required to wear Mobil uniforms." 6 This
redundancy undoubtedly contributes to the effectiveness of the communica83.
See Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1232 (1984)
("mhe efficiency of vicarious liability depends in large measure on the magnitude of certain transaction
costs in the negotiation and enforcement of a customized allocation of risk in agency contracts.").
84.
See generally Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the
Design of Liability Rules 1 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing in the context
of nuisance law that "allocative concerns can be decoupled from distributive concerns").
85.
See Lemley, supra note 2, at 1688 ("Trademarks are a compact and efficient means of communicating information to consumers."); id. at 1690 ("[Economists] have emphasized the efficiency by
which trademarks and advertising communicate useful information to consumers, and thereby reduce
consumer search costs.").
86.
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d 119, 122 (Fla. 1995).
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tion. Competitors of the trademark owner can neither register" nor use"' a
trademark that is likely to cause confusion. The power-and hence the valueof a trademark depends on the size of the market, the degree of recognition that
mark has in it, and the perceived reputation of the trademark owner. Because
this kind of information is inherently public, customers are in a relatively good
position to estimate the value of a trademark, at least in rough terms.89
Businesses do not use their entity names to communicate with customers.9" Perhaps for that reason, entity names are often confusingly similar. Few
customers would know the difference between Mobil Corporation, Mobil Oil
Corporation, Mobil Oil Company Limited, and Mobil International Petroleum
Corporation, and even fewer would have any idea which was capable of providing financial assurance. For readers of this Article, it is probably only the
presence of the trademark "Mobil" in these names that suggests that any of
these corporations are capable of providing any financial assurance at all.
The trademark owner liability proposed here will not likely come to
rest with the trademark owner. Many trademark licensors already require

financial responsibility and indemnification from their licensees. 9 Under the
proposed regime of trademark owner liability, trademark owners' incentives
to impose such requirements will be greater. The change will be an improvement because it will compel trademark owners and their licensees to internalize
liability that they can externalize under current law.92 The prospect of internalization will provide trademark owners and their licensees with incentives to
employ cost-effective measures to reduce injuries.93
Forcing trademark owners and their licensees to internalize liability
increases their costs. They may pass some of those cost increases on to
87.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (Supp. V 1999).
88.
See id. § 1114(1) (1994).
89.
That is, they would know that the liability of Microsoft or McDonald's was valuable
and that the liability of Jake's Used Cars or Joe's Restaurant might not be.
90.
For example, Federated Department Stores is the parent corporation of a group that
owns several high-visibility department store chains, including Bloomingdale's, Macy's, Burdines,
Bon March6, and Lazarus. See http://www.federated-fds.com/home.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
Very few people think of these venerable names as "Federated Department Stores."
91.
See 5 GILSON, supra note 82, at Form 28-3, § 9.
92.
Only the assets of licensees are at risk in the current system, but the assets of both trademark
owners and licensees would be at risk in the new system. Because more sources of recovery would be
available to them in the new system, plaintiffs would tend to collect larger portions of the same
liability. The statement in the text assumes that trademark owners will be able to shift at least
some of the additionally collected liability to licensees by contract.
93.
See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice,
1994 U. ILL. L.REV. 1, 32 ("To the extent that a firm knows that it will not have to fully compensate its future tort victims, it has too little incentive to take care to prevent accidents in the first
instance."); Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope
of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 563, 569 (1988) ("Vicarious
liability reduces or eliminates some of the inefficiencies that can arise under personal liability.").
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customers in the form of higher prices. Some of those customers will be people
of modest means. That is not, however, reason to reject the proposal. First,
some of the liability will be eliminated rather than passed along. That is, the
higher costs will compel some trademark owners and their licensees to adopt
cost-effective measures to reduce the injuries they inflict on customers. That
reduction will be a net social gain. Second, when viewed properly, the
"higher" prices in a trademark owner liability regime are not in fact higher.
The higher nominal price under a liability-internalizing regime is more than
offset by a hidden cost-the uncompensated injuries that customers suffer
under a liability-externalizing regime.
Professor John Hanks has proposed that franchisors be liable for the torts
of their franchisees as guarantors,94 rather than jointly and severally with the
franchisees, as I propose here. The crux of Professor Hanks's argument is that
most franchisees are financially responsible with respect to most claims:
1lit is both inefficient and unfair to require franchisors to regularly
defend themselves at substantial costs and great distances from their
central offices against claims of vicarious liability when plaintiffs have
adequate remedies against local franchisees who are, after all, the parties
responsible for the plaintiffs' injuries and other losses. Much of those
costs can be avoided by substituting guarantor liability for the current
vicarious liability of franchisors since plaintiffs would not have a cause of
action against a franchisor (assuming the franchisor has not itself been
negligent) unless the franchisee was unavailable to be sued or unable to
pay a judgment. 9
Hanks's proposal has two weaknesses. First, his factual assumption that
franchisors are compelled by current law to "defend themselves at substantial
costs and great distances from their central offices" may be incorrect. If the
franchisees carry liability insurance, the insurance company is likely providing
the defense by retaining local counsel. 96 The franchisor would have a financial
stake only in the cases in which liability might exceed the insurance and other
resources of the franchisee. That places opponents of trademark owner liability
on the horns of a dilemma. Both the current system and the system Hanks proposes place some of the risk that liability might exceed the insurance and other

See Hanks, supra note 18, at 8 ("In place of the current vicarious liability imposed on the
94.
franchisor, this Article proposes imposing liability on franchisors as guarantors.").
Id. at 9.
95.
See, e.g., Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance
96.
Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 265 (1995) ("For the last century, these common insurance arrangements have permitted the [insurance] company to select counsel to defend an action, to supervise
counsel's litigation and settlement strategy, and to settle claims within policy limits at the company's
discretion.").
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resources of the franchisee on the innocent plaintiff.9" If the risk is minimal,
there is little reason not to adopt trademark owner liability. If the risk is substantial, it means that trademark owners are externalizing substantial liability
and many injured plaintiffs will go uncompensated. Moreover, imposing trademark owner liability would reduce the potential for conflict between trademark
owners and their licensees-both would bear the same liability in the initial
action. That would make it easier for insurers to write one policy and provide
one defense for the owners and their licensees.
Second, Hanks fails to say whether he would permit the plaintiff to sue on
the guarantee in the initial lawsuit. If he would, the franchisor would be put to
a defense in every case. If he would not, a second lawsuit would be necessary
whenever the franchisee did not pay the judgment rendered in the first. That
second lawsuit would happen long after the litigated events, the franchisor
would be entitled to retry exactly the issues resolved -in the first lawsuitincluding the amount of the plaintiffs damages-and one side or the other
would be compelled to sue or defend "at substantial costs and great distances"
from their homes. To the extent such a splitting of the litigation were desirable, the courts could do it in a trademark owner liability regime. Current law
already gives discretion to sever and stay particular causes of action in the
interests of efficiency.9" That discretion should continue, making the kind of
protection Hanks proposes redundant.
B.

Trademark Owner Liability Should Be Non-Disclaimable

Disclaimer of trademark owner liability should not be permitted. If it
were, trademark owners would almost certainly seek to maintain the status quo
through the change in regimes by requiring their customers to accept their
disclaimers of liability. Mobil, for example, might continue to franchise the
same chain of minimarts under the same family of trademarks, but prominently
display a statement that "This business is operated by Bud and Judy's Mini
Mart. Mobil assumes no liability." Three problems make it inadvisable to give
effect to such disclaimers.
97.
John Hanks's system does it in a subtler fashion, merely delaying the lawsuit against the
trademark owner rather than barring it. In some cases, the trademark owners will become insolvent, lose their insurance, or judgment proof themselves in the interim.
98.
See Applewhite v. Reichhold Chems. Inc., 67 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1995). As stated
by the Applewhite court:
Under Rules 20 and 21, the district court has the discretion to sever an action if it is
misjoined or might otherwise cause delay or prejudice. Further, the district court also has
discretion to sever claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), in furtherance of
convenience or economy, or to prevent prejudice.
Id. (citation omitted).
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First, and most importantly, the customer does not know who Bud and
Judy's Mini Mart is and has no means for determining its level of financial
responsibility. Bud and Judy's Mini Mart may or may not own the premises. It
may or may not carry substantial amounts of liability insurance. Even if customers confronted with such disclaimers understood that they could not rely
on the liability of the trademark owner and knew the name of the entity on
whose liability they could rely, they would neither know nor be able to
discover the value of that liability.99 Customers would be forced to choose
among offers of liability without sufficient facts, which would continue the
system and market failures that currently exist.
Second, traditional forms of disclaimers would be unlikely to make customers actually aware they were not dealing with the trademark owner.
Traditional disclaimers would be less prominent than the trademarks,' °° they
would be inherently ambiguous because they would conflict with the assuring
message of the trademarks,'"' they would lack the redundancy in use that is
typical of trademarks,0 2 and they would lack the associationally generated emotional impact of trademarks.' 3 The little empirical evidence available suggests
that such disclaimers would not communicate effectively. 4
To assess the financial responsibility of an otherwise unknown licensee, the customer would
99.
need to know what insurance the licensee carried, the entity structure of the licensee, and the
financial condition of the licensee. Even if this information were supplied, most customers would
not be able to evaluate it. The transaction costs would be enormous.
See Franklyn, supra note 12, at 722 (proposing, with respect to an automobile, "a large
100.
sticker," presumably on the window).
See id. at 722-27 (discussing the mixed message sent by such a disclaimer used in con101.
junction with the trademark); Michael M. Greenfield & Joshua M. Schindler, Liability of a
Franchisor to a Franchisee 34-35 (1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("Whether
or not a sign over the door proclaims the independence of the franchisee, it remains true that the
consumer actually relies on the franchisor, not the franchisee, and that the franchisor intends and
encourages this reliance.").
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
102.
That is, a principal purpose of advertising is to create positive, comforting associations with
103.
the trademark. For disclaimers to have the same emotional impact would require advertising that
associated the trademark with the dangers created by the disclaimers. One can imagine, for example,
mandatory trademark owner advertising featuring heartbreaking vignettes of lives destroyed by acquiescing in ill-advised disclaimers. Except in extraordinary circumstances-such as cigarette
smoking--such advertising is not a practical possibility.
See Emerson, supra note 20, at 656 (finding that only about a third of the public and
104.
franchise customer respondents in Gainesville, Florida knew that the local Coldwell Banker Realtors
were locally owned and operated even though the franchise "states in all advertisements that it is
independently owned and operated" and includes in such advertisements the name of the local owner).
Invalidating ineffective disclaimers in litigation is not an appealing solution to this problem for
several reasons. First, the issue would arise frequently, necessitating many lawsuits. Second, the validity
of the disclaimers would depend on a factual inquiry and hence be costly to litigate. Third, many injured
parties would be unaware of their rights to invalidate ineffective disclaimers and so would not exercise,
or be protected by, them.
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Third, the legitimate purposes for which disclaimers of vicarious trademark owner liability might be used could be accomplished more transparently
by disclaimers of the underlying direct liability. Even under a trademark owner
liability regime, manufacturers, sellers, and franchisees would continue to have
the right to disclaim direct liability under the Uniform Commercial Code and
other substantive law directed specifically at the disclaimer issue,05 subject to
already existing procedural and substantive limitations." If, under the proposed regime, manufacturers, sellers, and franchisees disclaim in accord with the
substantive law of disclaimer, no liability will exist to be transmitted vicariously
to the trademark owner.
Trademark owners would need the additional right to disclaim trademark
owner liability in only two circumstances. The first is when the trademark
owner wanted to disclaim liability of a nature its licensees could not. Such
disclaimers should be barred to licensors for the same reasons they are barred to
licensees. The second circumstance is when the parties would disclaim for the
purpose of limiting liability to the extent of the licensee's financial resources.
That purpose could be achieved without disclaimer of trademark owner liability, simply by specifying the extent of the licensee's resources and limiting the
licensee's liability to that amount. Customers are more likely to understand
such an express limit on liability than a limit that flows by operation of law
from the customer's "acceptance" of a particular entity structure.

III. THE CONDITIONS OF TRADEMARK OWNER LIABILITY
The appeal of trademark owner liability will be greater if it can be implemented through rules that are both principled and specific. This part begins an
exploration of what those rules might be.
A. To Whom Should Trademark Owner Liability Run?
The rationale for trademark owner liability-that trademark owners are
better able to evaluate the entity structures of their trademark users than are
customers-suggests that trademark owner liability should be limited to customers and similarly situated persons. For this purpose, a customer is a person
who buys goods or services in the ordinary course of the seller's business.
105.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-316 (2001) (regulating the disclaimer of warranties in sale-of-goods
transactions).
106.
See, e.g., V.S.H. Realty, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 757 F.2d 411, 418 (lst Cit. 1985) (discussing
whether a particular disclaimer was invalid as an attempt to contract out of liability for fraud);
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 519 F. Supp. 60, 71 (S.D. Ga. 1981) ("In
order to contract out of liability for negligence, the contract must specifically disclaim liability for
negligence.").
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Customers would include both consumers who buy from businesses and businesses that buy from other businesses. In most instances, business-customers
are no better situated than consumer-customers to evaluate the entity structures of their sellers. Some customers may lack the necessary sophistication
and skills, but for most the problem will be that the amounts in issue are too
small to justify the expense of investigation and analysis. The rationale for
trademark owner liability extends as much to Price Waterhouse's purchase of
100 Honeywell keyboards as to Regina Yoder's purchase of one. Neither customer can cost-effectively figure out who is behind the Honeywell trademark.
United Airlines' purchase of a dozen jumbo jets from Boeing is a different
case. Given the amount of money at stake, United Airlines can, and probably
will, investigate and analyze Boeing's entity structure. With respect to this transaction, United Airlines is not in need of trademark owner liability. 0 7 Providing
that liability, however, is unlikely to do any harm because even in a regime that
did not permit disclaimer of trademark owner liability, sophisticated customers
would as a practical matter still have the ability to contract around trademark
owner liability. As noted previously, the parties retain the right to disclaim all
or any part of the underlying liability as permitted by other law, and when the
108
parties do that, the result is to disclaim the trademark owner liability as well.
If the parties to this transaction wanted to limit Boeing's liability to an amount
equal to the assets owned by a particular Boeing entity, they could so provide in
their agreement."° To prevent trademark owners from using this technique in
small transactions the courts should give effect to such disclaimers only if the
trademark owner discloses to the customer both the owner's entity structure
and the information necessary to evaluate it."0
The rationale for trademark owner liability recommends that the liability operate not just in favor of customers, but also in favor of third parties
injured by the products or services sold under the trademark. Those third
parties would include, for example, a person injured by reliance on a negligently
prepared audit report and a passenger injured in the crash of a defective airliner.
Such persons are no better situated than customers to evaluate the entity
structures of the sellers, but they are often responsive to the trademarks displayed.
107.
In a particularly thoughtful article, Professor William J.Woodward, Jr. has examined the
comparative needs of contracting parties for relief from the general presumption of freedom of contract.
See William J.Woodward, Jr., "Sale" of Law and Forum and the Widening Gulf Between "Consumer" and
"Nonconsumer" Contracts in the UCC, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 243 (1997).
108.
See supra Part II.B.
An alternative means of dealing with the problem would be to permit disclaimers of
109.
trademark owner liability by some kinds of parties in some kinds of cases. See Woodward, supra note
107, at 275-82 (discussing the line-drawing techniques used in various legislation).
Such a prohibition would be needed to prevent trademark owners from using boilerplate
110.
versions of substantive-liability disclaimers as the equivalent of trademark owner liability disclaimers.
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Some aspects of third-party liability are controversial,"' but this Article
does not intend to engage that controversy. Legislators should eliminate inappropriate third-party liability. But to the extent that third parties remain
entitled to sue those doing business under a trademark, they should be entitled
to sue the trademark owner. To put the argument another way, lawmakers
should fix the scope of third-party liability with the public interest in mind;
trademark owners should not be able to override lawmakers' decisions by
deploying entity structures. References to customers throughout this Article
should be understood to include such third parties to the extent of their rights
under substantive law.
The principal groups omitted from protection by the "customer" test
would be lenders and other suppliers to the trademark owner's business,
employees, and tax and regulatory authorities. Most lenders investigate the
entity structures and financial responsibility of their borrowers as part of the
credit-checking process, so few lenders are in need of trademark owner liability.
Lenders and their borrowers often use the borrowers' entity structures to allocate risks between them."2 For example, banks often require, as a condition
of the making of a real estate loan, that the borrower set up a new entity to
hold title to the property. Imposing trademark owner liability would disrupt
these relatively benign established practices.
Probably few tax and regulatory authorities are in need of trademark
owner liability. Tax and regulatory authorities are repeat players with the
power to control the entity structures of their debtors'.. or to impose liability

111.
See, e.g., Ernst & Young L.L.P. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2001)
(stating that an accounting firm may be held liable to a third party for fraudulent misrepresentations in
an audit report if the third party can show that the firm had a "reason to expect" that the third party
would rely on the misrepresentations); Richard I. Miller & Michael R. Young, Financial Reporting and
Risk Management in the 21st Century, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2013 (1997) ("The issue of those who
may sue an accountant has plagued the profession for more than a half-century." (footnote omitted)).
112.
See, e.g., In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (involving
real estate collateral separated among numerous corporations, with control over bankruptcy filing
residing with a director selected and paid by the bank lender). The purpose of the condition is to avoid
entanglements between the bank's loan and other extensions of credit to the debtor. If, for example,
the borrowing entity files bankruptcy, the case will be a "single-asset" bankruptcy and the bank will be
the only substantial creditor.
113.
That is, governments can, and often do, determine by regulation the entity structures of the
businesses with whom they deal. See, e.g., Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammam, Overview of the
Gramm-LeachBliley Act, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 1 (2000) (describing federal limitations on the entity
structures of banks). State and federal regulatory laws often impose financial responsibility requirements
on regulated firms. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-2 (2001) (requiring minimum capital of $2 million
to charter a bank in North Carolina). Regulations often reach the entire corporate group-defined in
terms of control-not just the particular entity that engages in the regulated activity. See Blumberg,
supra note 25, at 307-11.
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on their debtors without respect to their entity structures."' Their systems and
techniques have evolved over time to afford them the level of protection for
which there is political support.
Suppliers-particularly smaller suppliers-and employees constitute
intermediate groups for whom trademark owner liability will sometimes be
appropriate. Their cases are less compelling than those of customers.
A supplier is the business on the other end of the transaction from a customer. That is, if Micron is Itel's customer, then Itel is Micron's supplier. One
might assume that if Itel should have trademark owner liability to Micron,
Micron should also have trademark owner liability to Itel. The suppliercustomer relationship, however, differs from the customer-supplier relationship
in one crucial respect. Suppliers extend substantial amounts of credit to customers, but customers extend only small amounts of credit to suppliers. As a
result, suppliers are more concerned with liability and more likely to investigate
the entity structures and creditworthiness of their customers. Many, if not
most, suppliers have access to the business credit reporting system and use it in
their capacity as suppliers."' Relatively few customers have such access, and
even those who do are unlikely to use it in their capacity as customers. Thus,
generally speaking, suppliers are better situated than customers to evaluate the
entity structures of those with whom they deal, and consequently less dependent on trademarks.
Employees are also better positioned than customers to understand a
business's entity structure. Employees extend credit to their employers in that
they do the work before they are paid and they accrue entitlements to benefits
such as vacations, sick leave, and pensions. Because employment is usually a
major transaction for the employee, employees often have sufficient incentives
to investigate the entity structures and creditworthiness of their employers.
Because they are inside their employers' businesses, employees are generally
better situated than customers to obtain information. On the other hand,
many employees lack the sophistication necessary to understand the
precariousness of their positions as creditors and the significance of the facts

See, e.g., United Dominion Indus. Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822 (2001) (holding that
114.
product liability losses are tax characteristics attributable to corporate groups, not to entities within the
groups).
Dun & Bradstreet is the principal business credit reporting agency in the United States.
115.
That firm offers a trademarked D-U-N-S Numbering System to identify companies and company
affiliations for its subscribers. The purpose is to assist subscribers in understanding their prospective
debtors' entity structures. See DUN & BRADSTREET CORP., FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDING
DECEMBER 31, 1998, at Item 1 (mentioning the D-U-N-S system).
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they discover."6 Trademark owner liability is thus probably appropriate for
some employment relationships and not for others.
B.

In What Circumstances Should Trademark Owner Liability Accrue?

The rationale for trademark owner liability-that trademark owners are
better able to evaluate the entity structures of their licensees than are
customers-does not warrant imputing the liability of everyone who deals in a
trademarked product to the trademark owner. Some who deal in trademarked
products are not even licensees. As Thomas McCarthy explains:
[Tihe general rule is that a merchant or dealer who merely resells the
branded goods without change is not infringing and needs no license.
For example, a used car dealer has the right to sell a used FORD or
CHEVROLET auto, clearly labeled as "used," by describing it for what
it is: a used car of that particular source. However, a license would be
needed when the manufacturer of branded goods permits a dealer to
hold itself out as an "authorized" dealer, repair outlet, and the like."'
As a result, customers often rely on trademarks in transactions to which neither
the trademark owner nor a licensee is a party.
Trademark owners are likely to know the entity structures of their licensees. But they are less likely to know the entity structures of the perhaps
thousands of nonlicensees that merely buy and resell their products or supply
components for inclusion in the products." 8 As a result, liability should less
often be imputed when the wrongdoer is not a licensee.
1.

Nonlicensees

Only the defective-product liability of nonlicensee resellers and component manufacturers should be imputed to the owners of the trademarks
under which the goods are sold. The imputation of defective-product liability
is consistent with the function of trademarks. "A trademark carries with it a
message that the trademark owner is controlling the nature and quality of the
116.
For example, the highest priority available for the pre-petition claims of employees for wages
and benefits under U.S. bankruptcy law ranks them behind the claims of secured creditors and expenses
of administration. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist
Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 696, 710-11 (1999) (describing the priority of employment claims
under U.S. bankruptcy law). That priority is available for only modest amounts. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 507(a)(2), (3) (Supp. V 1999) (limiting the combination of wages and benefits to $4300).
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 18:41 (citations omitted).
117.
118.
To illustrate the latter circumstance, an automobile manufacturer may purchase a
component--such as an engine-from another manufacturer without licensing that manufacturer to
use the trademark under which the automobiles are sold.
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goods or services sold under the mark.. '" 9 More importantly, the trademark
provides the basis for informed decisionmaking by customers. As Honeywell v.
Yoder illustrates, the buyers and users of trademarked goods have no practical
means other than the trademark for knowing who manufactured or sold the
goods. Buyers and users of goods must rely on the trademark owners to control
all latent aspects of quality. Under current law, trademark owners already have
the right, the ability, and a reputational incentive to control quality. Trademark owner liability would add a liability incentive to control quality.'
On the other hand, trademark owners do not have the practical ability to
monitor or control aspects of nonlicensees' businesses other than the quality of
the trademarked products. The trademark owner may not know the ultimate
source of some components of the trademarked product or the identities of the
retail outlets that sell the trademarked product. In the nonlicensee context,
therefore, trademark owner liability should be limited to defects in the product
itself. It should not extend to other torts committed by nonlicensor component manufacturers or product resellers.
Separately owned, multiple trademarks are sometimes used to identify the
same product. For example, a football helmet may bear both the trademark of
the National Football League and that of the particular team. Children's
pajamas may bear both the trademark of the pajama manufacturer and the
trademarked image of a comforting cartoon character. In both circumstances,
both trademark owners should be liable. In most such cases, both trademarks
are intended to, and do, play material roles in inducing customers to purchase,
and both trademark owners undertake the trademark owner's duty to control
product quality.'2 ' More importantly, the recognizable cartoon character on
the pajamas are for some customers their only means for identifying the person

119.
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 18.42. But see Kevin Parks, "Naked" Is Not a Four-Letter
Word: Debunking the Myth of the "Quality Control Requirement" in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK
REP. 531, 557-61 (1992) (arguing that trademark owners should not have an obligation to control the
quality of the products sold under their marks).
120.
Nevertheless, the drafters of the Restatement recently rejected trademark owner liability:
The rule stated in this section does not, by its terms, apply to the owner of a trademark who licenses a manufacturer to place the licensor's trademark or logo on the
manufacturer's product and distribute it as though manufactured by the licensor. In such
a case, even if purchasers of the product might assume that the trademark owner was the
manufacturer, the licensor does not "sell or distribute as its own a product manufactured
by another." Thus ... the licensor ... is not liable under this Section of this Restatement.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 14 cmt. d (1998); see also supra note 18.
121.
Professor Franklyn acknowledges that "[i]ndeed, it seems odd to say that licensors have
a legal duty to police -their licensees for quality, but then to presume that licensors are basically
passive investors and thus entitled to a presumption of nonliability." Franklyn, supra note 17, at
45. Franklyn also notes that "virtually every trademark license contains boilerplate language giving the licensor the 'right to control the quality' of the licensed goods." Id. at 34.

Trademark-BasedLiability System

1127

with whom they deal. The liability should be joint and several, with the parties
free to allocate the liability between them by contract.
To escape the rationale and result I propose in the preceding paragraph,
Professor David Franklyn distinguishes two "non-classical" types of trademark
licensing.' In "collateral licensing" the owner uses the trademark on a different type of goods from those on which demand for the mark was first created.'
Franklyn uses General Motors refrigerators as an example. In "promotional
trademark licensing," the owner uses the trademark to engender consumer
identification with the mark. Franklyn uses Coke pants as an example, 24'
but he might well have used a cartoon character on pajamas. He then argues
that the licensors in these kinds of arrangements do not have the ability to
monitor the quality of the goods, and from that premise concludes that the
licensors should be absolved of legal responsibility for the goods.'25 His
argument is flawed in two respects. First, it recognizes a violation of lawfailure to control quality-as a reason for ignoring that law. By requiring
licensors to control quality,'26 the Lanham Act established the meaning of the
trademark's appearance on goods. To the extent that trademark owners are
unable to control quality in collateral and promotional licensing, those types of
licensing are not entitled to an exemption from law. They are simply illegal. 22
Second, acceptance of Franklyn's argument leads to the conclusion that the
burden of judging the quality of goods should be on the customer. Whatever
the difficulties for Coca-Cola in judging the quality of pants sold under its
trademark, the difficulties for consumers are clearly much greater. Collateral
and promotional licensors should have trademark owner liability for the same
reasons as other licensors.

See id. at 12-14.
122.
Id.
123.
See id. at 12-13.
124.
See id. at 46. Franklyn argues:
125.
One cannot reasonably expect a collateral or promotional licensor to police its licensees' goods
to determine whether they are of the same quality as other goods bearing the same mark,
because the licensor has never manufactured other similar goods under that mark. Thus, the
licensor could not possibly develop meaningful standards to ensure uniform quality.
Id. Kevin Parks makes a similar argument. See Parks, supra note 119, at 561--64.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
126.
Notice that Franklyn has hypothesized that Coca-Cola is unable to meet the trademark
127.
standard of insuring uniform quality. See Franklyn, supra note 17, at 16. Such a failure is grounds for
cancellation of the mark. See supra notes 81, 119 and accompanying text. Franklyn should have argued
that Coca-Cola was capable of controlling quality to meet the trademark standard, but not to meet the
tort standard. But the disingenuous nature of that argument becomes apparent when one tries to use it
to justifi an entire class of licensing. That a huge class of trademark owners are capable of exercising
enough control to meet one vague, abstract standard but not another is not merely unproven but
implausible.
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The rule of trademark owner liability I propose would distinguish the
situation in which one of the trademarks was used in a manner that indicated it
identified only a single component of the product. An example would be the
Firestone trademark on the tires of a Ford SUV. Because customers would
understand the Firestone trademark to relate only to the tires, Firestone should
not be liable for defects in other parts of the SUV.' 28 Ford, however, should be
liable for defects in any part of the SUV, including the tires, because it authorized use of its trademark in a manner that conveyed to customers that Ford
stands behind the entire SUV, including parts not manufactured by Ford.
Under the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's view, it is possible for an owner's trademark to appear lawfully on goods without the trademark
owner's permission.129 This exception appears to be quite narrow, however,
applying only in circumstances in which customers do not infer "a connection
between the [seller's] product and the trademark owner." ' When the exception does apply, the trademark owner should not be liable. In keeping with the
rationale, trademark owner liability should accrue only upon authorized use of
the trademark.
2.

Trademark Licensees

Generally, trademark owners should be liable for wrongful acts committed
by their licensees against customers. However, not all trademark license relationships are sufficiently close to warrant that extension of liability. For
example, a store that sells sound systems at retail may be an "authorized dealer"
or "franchisee" for dozens of manufacturers. None of those relationships may
be much more than buyer-seller. A manufacturer may have thousands of such
dealers or franchisees, little knowledge of their entity structures or financial
responsibility, and little practical ability to obtain such knowledge. When such
multiple dealer or franchisee relationships are visible to customers, they are
unlikely to mislead. Customers who know that a business sells competing

128.
The trademark liability rule would thus be consistent with the underlying product liability
rule. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 (1998) (making sellers and
distributors of components liable only for defects in the components).
129.
See Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 920 (9th Cit. 1980)
(holding that jeweler's sale of rings bearing trademarked insignia of the Job's Daughters organization did
not infringe the trademark because the insignia was a "functional component" of the ring). But see
Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975).
130.
Int'l Order of Job's Daughters, 633 F.2d at 919. Professor Mark Lemley argues persuasively that the exception should be broadened. See Lemley, supra note 2, at 1706-09; see also Alex
Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (1993).
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products under competing trademarks should not suppose that any one of the
trademark owners operates that business. 31
The same isnot true when the dealer or franchisee represents only a single
trademark owner. Exclusive representation of a single producer of trademarked
goods or services implies that the trademark owner is,or takes responsibility for,
the dealer or franchisee. 32' In an exclusive representation arrangement, the
trademark usually identifies the dealer or franchisee's business to customers.
That is,they think of the business as a McDonald's restaurant or a Chevron gas
station. Accordingly, I propose that the broad form of trademark owner
liability-that which imputes liability for all wrongful acts of the licensee
committed under the trademark-should apply only against those trademark
owners who authorize their licensees to use the trademark, alone or in conjunction with another name, to identify the business.
Some trademark uses neither identify the trademark owner as the source
of quality control for the product nor identify the business. They include all
uses of certification or collective marks,' 33 the use of the Visa or Mastercard
trademarks to indicate that the business accepts payment by a particular
method,' 3 co-branding arrangements such as the placement of a Taco Bell
131.
This situation does appear to satisfy the rationale for imposing trademark owner liability-failure to do so leaves the customer with no means for assessing the financial responsibility of
the licensee with whom the customer is forced to deal. This situation is, however, distinguishable
from the routine-disclaimer situation. Here the trademark owner is not capturing the economic
benefit of appearing to take responsibility (though not liability) for acts of the licensee.
132.
That implication would continue even if the trademark owner clearly disclaims liability
for acts of the licensee. See, e.g., Parks, supra note 119, at 559 ("All trademarks indicate source,
enabling the public to make purchasing decisions based on the reliability of that source ....
There
is no reason to alter the free market equation by imposing an artificial quality requirement with
respect to products produced pursuant to a trademark license."). In essence, Parks is saying that
even in the absence of liability, customers expect the market to force trademark owners to take
responsibility for products sold under their marks.
133.
A "certification mark" is a mark used by a person other than the owner of the mark "to
certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics
of such person's goods or services." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) (including definition of "certification
mark"). An example would be the trademark of Underwriter's Laboratory on various consumer
appliances to indicate compliance with particular performance standards.
A "collective mark" is a mark used by the members of a group or organization. See id. An example
would be the use of a geographical designation to indicate the region where a particular wine was
produced.
134.
Visa and Mastercard license their trademarks for use by businesses that are authorized to
accept their cards as payment for goods or services. Because Visa and Mastercard attempt to license only
reputable businesses and in some circumstances reverse payments made by customers who later indicate
dissatisfaction with purchases, display of the Visa or Mastercard trademark is widely understood as a
guarantee of quality. Because Visa and Mastercard do investigate their licensees, they are probably
better able to evaluate the licensees' entity structures and financial responsibility than are the licensees'
customers. A case might be made for the imposition of trademark owner liability on Visa and
Mastercard, but making it is beyond the scope of this Article.
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restaurant inside Exxon stations,13 ' and the display of the FedEx or UPS logos

to indicate shipping options.'36 The identification-of-the-business test advocated here would not impose liability on them. It would, however, impose
liability on any trademark owner that authorized the use of its mark in the
name by which a business or business location was known. For example, Mobil
Oil Corporation would be liable for torts committed in the operation of the
Mobil Mini Mart, even if the name were changed to "Bud and Judy's Mobil Mini
Mart." Nor should the result change if the name on the business were "Bud
and Judy's Mini Mart," but the premises otherwise retained the same appearance, with Mobil logos, insignia, and color scheme. The authorized use of
Mobil trademarks in a manner that customers understood to identify the
business-not just the products sold by the business-as "Mobil" would be
sufficient to impose trademark owner liability on the owner of the Mobil
trademark. Use in a manner that communicated only that the business sold
Mobil products would not be sufficient to impose trademark owner liability. 3 '
3.

Trademark Sharing

Although controversial, the currently prevailing view regards a trademark
as the "property" of the registrant. 13 Consistent with that view, a registrant has
the right to enjoin another's use of the mark if that use is "likely to cause
confusion."'39 Such an injunction may protect customers from confusing uses,
and such protection is often cited in support of trademark as an institution."
135.
The example is Mark Lemley's. Probably few customers would be confused regarding the
identity of the party with whom they dealt in purchasing a burrito in such a station. Exxon and Taco
Bell are endorsing each other by entering into such an arrangement, providing the basis for an argument
that they should be liable for one another's tort, but that isnot an argument I choose to make here.
136.
Federal Express, United Parcel Service, and other common carriers license their trademarks for use by businesses that offer to ship customers' purchases by the particular carrier. Because
the carriers do only the most cursory evaluation of the entity structure and financial responsibility of
their licensees, the rationale for trademark owner liability probably does not apply to them.
137.
If substantially all of the products sold by a business were the products of a particular
trademark owner, the products themselves might convey to customers an affiliation between the
business and the trademark owners. In that event, nondisclaimable trademark owner liability should
accrue. The business could escape liability by also prominently selling the products of the trademark
owner's competitors.
138.
See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 2, at 1705 ("[C]ourts are increasingly treating trademarks
as if they were property in their own right.").
139.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994).
140.
See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 2, at 1695 ("We give protection to trademarks for one basic
reason: to enable the public to identify easily a particular product from a particular source."); see
also Kristen Knudsen, Tomorrow Never Dies: The Protection of James Bond and Other Fictional
Characters Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 13, 20 (2000)
(referring to "the traditional view of trademark protection as preventing a tort against the public,
not a trespass onto the trademark itself").
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Customers have, however, no legal right to such protection. Only registrants are entitled to remedies for infringement or misrepresentation under
trademark law. Consumers lack standing. 4' Consequently, the owner of a
trademark can allow unrelated persons to use the mark in a manner that creates
a substantial likelihood of confusing customers.
To illustrate, KPMG LLP is a big five tax and accounting firm. In
February 2001, it spun off a firm that took the name KPMG Consulting, Inc.
' Neither owns
These two firms are "completely separate" and "independent."142
the KPMG trademark. From the public record, they appear to be licensees
from a common source."' This joint use undoubtedly creates a substantial
likelihood of confusion; the firms insist that they are independent but their
trademark arrangement suggests they are not. Yet under current law, the trademark owner is the only one with the right to object.
From a systems point of view, confusing uses of trademarks are undesirable. They are no less so because one of the confusing users has authorized the
other's confusing use. Trademark owner liability would provide customers of
either business with a remedy against the trademark itself. Joint uses would not
be banned, and in fact might continue. But the owner of the trademark would
become a guarantor of the users' liability to their customers.
IV. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
Proposals for changes in law-related systems should be accompanied by
strategic analyses regarding the anticipated effects.'
Such analyses are
141.
See James S. Wrona, False Advertising and Consumer Standing Under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act: Broad Consumer Protection Legislation or a Narrow Pro-Competitive Measure?, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 1085, 1098 (1995) (concluding that recent developments have brought most
courts into agreement that consumers do not have standing to sue for misrepresentation, although
various rationales are still employed).
142.
Posting of Robert E.Jones, I1l, KPMG Consulting, Inc. (Dec. 7, 2001) (on file with author)
(disclaiming KPMG Consulting, Inc.'s responsibility for offensive linking policies of KPMG
LLP because KPMG Consulting, Inc. is "completely separate, independent"); KPMG CONSULTING,
INC., FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30,2001, at 1,LEXIS, Company Library, Access File:
KPMG Consulting, Inc .... was incorporated as a business corporation under the laws of the
State of Delaware in 1999 .... Our Company previously was a part of KPMG LLP, one of the
"Big 5" accounting and consulting firms. In January 2000, KPMG LLP transferred its
consulting business to our Company. In February 2001 we completed our initial public
offering, and on February 8, 2001 we began to trade on the Nasdaq National Market.
Id.
143.
Records of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office show several "KPMG" trademarks to be
owned by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership. See, e.g., Registration
Nos. 2339547, 2256394, 2218359, 2386745, available at http://tess.uspto.gov (last visited Mar. 15, 2002).
144.
See LoPucki, supra note 19, at 507-09 (describing strategic analysis and advocating its
use in evaluating proposals for legal reform). For examples of strategic analyses of proposed legal
reforms, see Lisa M. Bossetti & Mette H. Kurth, Professor Elizabeth Warren's Article 9 Carve-Out
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necessary because the effects of changes are seldom straightforward. In
response to change, system participants devise and employ strategies designed
to seek advantage under the new regime.'45 The strategies of various participants often interact to produce results that are unintended, difficult to predict,
or both. Strategic analysis enables the system manager to take into account not
just the direct results of implementation of the change, but also the indirect
results produced by strategy and strategic interaction. A strategic analysis can
be generated interactively by role playing or simply through a thought experiment conducted by the analyst. At a minimum, the analysis should be reduced
to writing to insure its internal logic.
Upon implementation of a trademark owner liability regime, strategically
minded trademark owners could be expected to seek some means of avoiding
the new liability. Removal of their trademarks from products and businesses
would seldom be cost-effective. The value of trademarks in marketing greatly
exceeds the liability trademarks would generate in the proposed regime.
Removal of their trademarks from marginal products or businesses might be
cost-effective for trademark owners. But that is not a problem because it would
also be cost-effective for society as a whole. Society as a whole is best served
when businesses are compelled to internalize the costs they generate and abandon ventures that generate more costs than benefits.'46
Alternatively, trademark owners might restrict use of their marks so that
they did not identify the products or businesses with which they were used. For
example, a minimart might present itself as a "business that sells Mobil
products" or a keyboard manufacturer might present its product as a Bull HN
keyboard "approved by Honeywell." This strategy too, would seldom be costeffective. Trademarks would be considerably less effective if they simply
endorsed rather than identified products or businesses. Nor would pursuit of an
"endorsement" strategy for trademark owners necessarily be a bad thing for customers. Were it widely deployed, it would cause the appearance of the system
of product distribution to better resemble reality. Customers could plainly see
that particular trademark owners were not taking full responsibility for their
products and outlets.
Yet another possibility is that trademark owners might respond by seeking
greater control over the channels of distribution, perhaps replacing franchised
Proposal: A Strategic Analysis, 30 UCC L.J. 3 (1997), which provides a strategic analysis of a proposed
change in creditor priorities, and Mark J.Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1
(1986), which analyzes a mass tort problem by examining strategies available to actors in the system.
145.
See generally Richard K. Neumann, Jr., On Strategy, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 299 (1990)
(explaining legal strategy and describing the role it plays in legal practice).
146.
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,52 U.
CHi. L. REV. 89, 104 (1985) ("Externalization of risk imposes social costs and thus isundesirable.").
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outlets with company-owned outlets. If the imposition of trademark owner

liability had this effect, however, it would indicate that the displaced method of
distribution had appeared "efficient" only because it enabled the trademark
owner to externalize liability.
Another possible strategy would be for trademark owners to continue current patterns of trademark use, but to judgment proof themselves. A trademark
owner might, for example, sell its marks to a wholly owned subsidiary that, after
the purchase, would own no assets except the trademarks and the accompanying goodwill. That subsidiary would license the trademarks to other members
of the corporate group, franchisees, and other outsiders. To assure that the
courts would respect its separate identity, the corporation would have to charge
reasonable royalties for the use of the trademarks,'47 but most of the fees could
be applied to the trademark acquisition debt or paid to the parent corporation
as dividends.'48
As part of the transaction in which it acquired the trademarks, the
corporation might be required to guarantee repayment of the corporate group's
bank loans and secure both the bank loans and the acquisition loans with the
trademarks. For most businesses, the amounts of the bank loans would exceed
the total value of the trademarks. As a result, the trademarks would be fully
encumbered.
If a licensee of one of the marks committed a tort and the victim obtained
a judgment against the trademark-owning entity, the secured claim of the bank
lenders would have priority over the judgment. To protect the value of their
collateral, the bank lenders would have to foreclose. The bank would be entitled to choose the collateral against which it would foreclose.'4 9 Acting in its
own interest, it would choose the trademarks because they would be threatened
by the judgment creditor. Governing law would require that the bank sell the
trademarks at a public or private sale. 5 In most cases, the trademark would have
greater value to other members of the trademark owner's corporate group than
to outsiders because the owner's group would continue to own the assets used in
conjunction with the trademarks,'"' while the outsiders would arguably have no
147.
See, e.g., In re B.J. McAdams, Inc., 66 F.3d 931,937 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that 'Directors
cannot lawfully manage the affairs of one of the corporations in the interest of the other"' (quoting
Rounds & Porter Lumber Co. v. Bums, 225 S.W.2d 1,3 (Ark. 1949)) (alteration in original)).
148.
Prior to commission of the tort, such dividends would not be fraudulent transfers or otherwise illegal. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irradonalityof Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1,
39 n.200 (1999) (acknowledging the legality of such dividends).
149.
See LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
633-34 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining the secured creditor's option).
150.
See U.C.C. § 9-610, -620 (2001).
151.
Those assets would not belong to the corporation that had trademark owner liability and
would not be sold with the trademarks. In some circumstances, a competitor may be willing to pay more
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right to use the trademarks at all.'5 2 As a result, other members of the trademark owner's corporate group usually would be able to outbid outsiders.'53 The
customer's judgment would be discharged by the sale, the customer would
recover nothing, and the marks would remain with the corporate group.
Trademark owner liability would be defeated.
This vulnerability to judgment-proof entity structures is not unique to
trademark owner liability. Elsewhere, I have demonstrated that virtually all
liability is vulnerable to judgment proofing, and I have predicted the ulti-

than the current owner in order to eliminate the current owner from the market. Those circumstances
are probably rare and may be constrained by antitrust considerations.
Purchase and use of the trademarks by outsiders would subject the marks to possible
152.
cancellation under the assignment-in-gross doctrine. See 15 U.S.C. § 10 (Supp. V 1999) (providing
that "[a] registered mark... shall be assignable with the good will of the business in which the mark is
used"). Although some erosion of the assignment-in-gross doctrine has occurred, see, e.g., Lemley, supra
note 2, at 1710 ("Mhe trend in trademark law clearly seems to be toward permitting assignments in
gross and 'naked,' or unsupervised, trademark licenses."), the doctrine retains at least some vitality.
See, e.g., Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 286, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding
a trademark abandoned because the owner had ceased business for a period of two years and,
alternatively, that an attempted sale of the trademark was void because it was an attempt to assign the
trademark in gross). But see Patterson Labs., Inc. v. Roman Cleanser Co., 802 F.2d 207, 208 (6th Cit.
1986) (holding a secured creditor entitled to the value of a trademark on default even though
equipment used in the business had not been assigned to the secured creditor along with trademark).
Allison McDade argues that it might be practical for buyers of the trademarks to sell their own
products under them. See Allison Sell McDade, Trading in Trademarks-Why the Anti-Assignment in
Gross Doctrine Should Be Abolished When Trademarks Are Used as Collateral,77 TEX. L. REV. 465, 477
(1998). She acknowledges, however, (1) some potential for confusion, see id. at 482, and (2) the need
for a change in the law to permit such sales, see id. at 475-76.
To illustrate the circumstances of such a sale, assume that the trademarks have a value to the
153.
business of $100 million, the remaining assets of the business are worth $300 million, the bank loan
(secured by the trademarks and assets owned by other members of the group) is $200 million and the
judgment isfor $50 million. The sale would discharge the bank's security interest in the trademarks and
the claim of the judgment creditor against them. See U.C.C. § 9-617(a) (2001). The proceeds of the
sale would be applied first to the bank's expenses in conducting the sale and then to the bank's loan. See
id. § 9-615(a). Only if a surplus remained would the judgment creditor recover anything. The bank
could bid up to $100 million to protect its interest in the trademarks, because it would know that the
other members of the corporate group will be willing to purchase them for that amount. The bidding
would probably stop at a considerably lower amount. It would then be in the interests of the bank to sell
the trademarks to other members of the group because that would protect the bank's interest in its
remaining collateral on the loan, and it would be in the interests of the other members of the group to
buy them. Because each party would be acting in its own self-interest at each stage of the transaction,
the arrangement need not be collusive. Absent collusion, the courts must uphold the transaction. See
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994) (holding that there is a conclusive presumption of
reasonably equivalent value for purposes of Bankruptcy Code § 548(a) when the transfer is made
through a noncollusive, regularly conducted foreclosure sale). Because the trademark would be fully
encumbered, the judgment creditor would have to raise the full amount of its bid in cash. The judgment
creditor could not profit from winning the bid because (1) the members of the corporate group would
have no incentive to pay more than the $100 million value to buy the trademarks back from the
judgment creditors, and (2) the bank would outbid the judgment creditor at any lesser amount.
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mate failure of the liability system itself.' Current law already honors a wide
array of judgment-proofing devices that, if used aggressively, could nullify
liability. Liability survives only because most businesses do not employ those
devices aggressively. Their reasons undoubtedly have more to do with the
anticipated cultural and political responses than with the anticipated legal
response. 155
I expect that the cultural and political limitations that prevent widespread
judgment proofing will disintegrate over time. Desperate businesses will
employ the judgment-proofing techniques first, and competitive forces will
compel others in their industries to follow. The soft judgment proofing in
widespread use today will gradually shift to harder modes that will defeat
liability entirely.
Trademark owner liability is, however, less vulnerable to judgment proofing than are other forms of liability. The close relationship between a firm's
trademark and the firm's public image gives added force to the cultural and
political limitations on judgment proofing. When large, public companies
construct barriers against liability, they disguise and misrepresent them to the
public.'56 For example, owners of famous trademarks can, and do, distance
themselves from their failing affiliates.' But to distance one's business from its
trademarks in the eyes of the public is virtually impossible. To the public, the
trademark is the business. When a judgment entered against the owner of a
famous trademark remains unpaid, that unmistakably signals financial
irresponsibility to the public.

154.

See LoPucki, supra note 23 (explaining the mechanisms by which the death of liability will

occur).

155.
See, e.g., id. at 51-54 (discussing the cultural and political responses).
156.
Consider, for example, the "ring fence" transaction in which PG&E sought to insulate
its non-utility assets from the claims of creditors of Pacific Gas & Electric, PG&E's bankrupt public utility subsidiary. When confronted on the issue by the Los Angeles Times, PG&E's spokesman
contended that the purpose of the transaction was merely "to provide for a separate credit rating for the
parent company's other entities." See Maura Dolan, PUC Not Ready to Concede Its Rate-Setting
Authority to Judge, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001, at A3 (citation omitted). The public was unlikely to
understand that the non-utility assets would receive a separate credit rating only because the ring fence
transaction appeared sufficient to defeat collection by the utility creditors.
157.
For example, Iridium was founded by Motorola and for the first three years of its existence,
was a wholly owned subsidiary of Motorola, Inc. Even at the time of Iridium's bankruptcy, Motorola
controlled Iridium through its 18 percent stockholding. But on its website, Motorola described the relationship as follows:
"Q: What is Motorola's role in all this?
Iridium and Motorola are two separate companies. Motorola has a minority interest in
Iridium LLC (less than 20%) as an equity investor, and guaranteed some of Iridium LLC's debt."
Christopher M. Kwok, Parent Companies and Subsidiaries: Public Attention and Corporate Costs
(2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). (The quoted material appeared at
http://www.motorola.com/satellite/info/ but has since been removed.)
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CONCLUSION
The United States is committed to a system that distributes goods and
services through markets. Markets can operate effectively only if market participants have the information they need to understand the choices they must
make. As the American legal system currently operates, customers have no
practical means for discovering the identities, entity structures, and financial
responsibility levels of the persons with whom they deal. No practical means
exist to provide that information. Customers make their market choices without
that information, usually on the basis of trademarks. They learn the identities
of the entities behind the trademark masks only when legal problems arise, and
then it is too late. The result is market and system failure.
That failure can be remedied by holding trademark owners liable for the
acts of authorized entities doing business under the marks, and for defective
products identified by the marks. With such a rule in place, the information
available to market participants-trademark information-would be sufficient
to calculate, in a rough sense at least, the value of the liability offered. That
is, customers enticed by a trademark would generally be aware of the
trademark's prominence, and that prominence would serve as a rough proxy for
the trademark owner's level of financial responsibility.
If trademark owner liability is imposed, most trademark licensors will
likely respond by requiring their licensees to purchase adequate liability insurance and to indemnify the licensors against liability for the licensees' wrongful
acts.'58 Trademark owner liability will ultimately come to rest upon trademark
owners only when, and to the extent, those owners select financially irresponsible licensees. Because trademark owners would be in a position to evaluate the
entity structures and financial responsibility of their prospective licensees and
to enforce the insurance and indemnification agreements, the result would be
a functioning market for liability. Licensors would have incentives to consider
the financial responsibility of their licensees, and licensees would have incentives to take closer-to-optimal levels of care and to provide closer-to-optimal
levels of insurance.
Under the banner of "tort reform" the liability system has been under
critical attack for more than two decades. 9 The critics may be inclined to
See, e.g., Hanks, supra note 18, at 31 (stating that "vicarious liability comes coupled with
158.
the right to indemnification, and even if it did not, franchisors would require it as part of the
franchise agreements").
See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "The Impact that It Has Had Is Between
159.
People's Ears:" Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (2000)
(describing the impact of tort reform discourse on prospective jurors); Robert S. Peck et al., Tort
Reform 1999: A Building Without a Foundation, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 397 (2000) ("For the
better part of thirty years, corporate and other interests bent on avoiding responsibility for their
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oppose trademark owner liability as an expansion of what they see as a deeply
flawed system. But, as I have noted elsewhere, governments have essentially
only two methods for imposing social control: relatively subtle civil liability and
relatively crude criminal incarceration."6 If civil liability is ineffective,
governments will have to expand their use of criminal incarceration or
abandon their efforts to enforce rights-including many kinds of property
rights.' 6 ' Faced with this dilemma, even the harshest critics of the liability
system call merely for the system's reform, not its abolition.
For the liability system to survive, it must overcome its dependency on
entity structure. Most customers do not deal with entities in any meaningful
sense. They deal with trademarks. When invisible entity structures enable
trademark owners to escape liability for those dealings, the effect is to judgment
proof the only significant actor on the scene-the trademark. If liability is
imposed for insufficient reasons or tort verdicts are excessive, the governing
rules of substantive law should be changed. But judgment-proof structures do
not distinguish between excessive verdicts and reasonable ones, or between
liability that is warranted and liability that is not. They defeat liability indiscriminately. Trademarks are the actors in our modem economy, and trademark
owner liability is merely a proposal to make them responsible actors.

misdeeds have led a battle to 'reform' the civil justice system in a manner that tilts the legal playing field
substantially and shamelessly in their favor."); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Tort Reform Past, Present and
Future: Solving Old Problems and Dealing with "New Style" Litigation, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.REV. 237
(2000) (presenting the tort reform movement from a defense perspective).
160.
See LoPucki, supra note 23, at 3.
161.
For example, enforcement of patent, trademark, and copyright rights are accomplished
principally through civil liability. See, e.g., id. at 4.

